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Justice Versus Benevolence: A Modern Humean View
Mario J. Rizzo*
A single act of justice is frequently contrary to the public interest; 
were it to stand alone, without being follow’d by other acts, may, in 
itself,  be very prejudicial  to society.  When a man of merit,  of a 
beneficent  disposition,  restores  a  great  fortune  to  a  miser,  or 
seditious bigot, he has acted justly and laudably, but the public is 
the real sufferer. Nor is every single act of justice, consider’d apart, 
more conducive to private interest, than to public; and ‘tis easily 
conceiv’d how a man may impoverish himself by a single instance 
of integrity, and have reason to wish, that with regard to that single 
act,  the  laws  of  justice  were  for  a  moment  suspended  in  the 
universe. But however single acts of justice may be contrary, either 
to  public  or  private interest,  ‘tis  certain,  that  the whole plan or 
scheme is highly conducive, or indeed absolutely requisite, both to 
the support of society, and the well-being of every individual. ‘Tis 
impossible  to  separate  the  good  from the  ill.  Property  must  be 
stable, and must be fix’d by general rules. Tho’ in one instance the 
public be a sufferer, this momentary ill is amply compensated by 
the steady prosecution of the rule, and by the peace and order, 
which it establishes in society.1
INTRODUCTION
A longstanding tradition has developed in political  and 
legal  philosophy,  associated  with  such  thinkers  as  Marcus 
Tullius  Cicero,  David  Hume,  Adam  Smith  and  Herbert 
Spencer,  that  strongly  differentiates  justice  from 
beneficence.  Justice  is  the  virtue  necessary  to  create  a 
framework of social stability in which individuals can pursue 
the  other  virtues,  including  beneficence,  as  they  deem 
appropriate.  Some have referred to  justice  as a “duty of 
perfect obligation”2 while referring to beneficence as a “duty 
of  imperfect  obligation.”3 Perfect  duties  are  relatively 
determinate in the sense that there is a definite obligation to 
perform in a particular way at a particular time. Justice refers 
* © 2008 Mario J. Rizzo.
1 * Department of Economics, New York University.
. DAVID HUME,  A  TREATISE ON HUMAN NATURE 497  (L.  A.  Selby-Bigge  ed., 
Oxford Univ. Press 1978) (1740) [hereinafter HUME, HUMAN NATURE].
2
2
. JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 48–49 (George Sher ed., Hackett Publ’g 
Co. 1979) (1861).
3
3
. Id.
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to the idea of restoring an individual to his condition prior to 
the  commission  of  a  wrong,  such  as  breach  of  contract, 
violation  of  property  rights,  or  an  attack  on  his  physical 
integrity.  Since the moral  obligation of  justice is  relatively 
determinate it can and should be enforceable by law. On the 
other  hand,  an  imperfect  duty  is  one  which  we  may  be 
“bound to practice, but not toward any definite person, [and] 
not at any prescribed time.” Beneficence is just such a virtue 
and “though the act is obligatory, the particular occasions of 
performing it  are  left  to  our  choice.”4 The  law,  therefore, 
cannot  appropriately  enforce  duties  of  beneficence.5 The 
fulfillment  of  these  duties  depends  on  many  particular 
circumstances  of  time  and  place;  that  is,  on  local  and 
personal  knowledge  that  is  prima  facie  unavailable  to 
governments.6
The  independence  of  justice  from  the  particular 
circumstances of time and place relative to the dependence 
of beneficence on such circumstances is an important factor 
responsible  for  distinctive  psychological  aspects  of  these 
virtues. For reasons I discuss below, I see that justice is an 
abstract virtue which does not give the individual  positive 
psychological  feedback  in  all  cases.  Indeed,  as  Hume 
mentions in  the opening quotation,  a single  act  of  justice 
4
4
. Id. at 48.
5
5
. Adam  Smith  emphasizes  the  legal-enforceability  issue  in  his 
Lectures on Jurisprudence:
Perfect rights are those which we have a title to demand and if 
refused to compel another to perform. What they [i.e., Pufendorf 
and Hutcheson] call imperfect rights are those which correspond to 
those  duties  which  ought  to  be  performed to  us  by  others  but 
which we have no title to compel them to perform; they having it 
entirely in their power to perform them or not . . . . A beggar is an 
object of our charity and may be said to have a right to demand it; 
but when we use the word right in this way it is not in a proper but 
a metaphorical sense. The common way in which we understand 
the word right, is the same as what we have called a perfect right, 
and is that which relates to commutative justice.  Imperfect rights, 
again, refer to distributive justice. The former are the rights which 
we  are  to  consider,  the  latter  not  belonging  properly  to 
jurisprudence, but rather to a system of morals as they do not fall 
under the jurisdiction of the laws.
ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 9 (R.L. Meek et al. eds., 1978) (1762–63).
6
6
. Consider,  for  example,  the  conclusion  of  Athol  Fitzgibbons: 
“[B]enevolence [for Smith] could not be legally enforced, because the civic 
obligations of citizens depended on circumstances that usually were too 
complex  for  codification.”  ATHOL FITZGIBBONS,  ADAM SMITH’S SYSTEM OF LIBERTY, 
WEALTH AND VIRTUE: THE MORAL AND POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 112 
(1995).
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may  be  (rightly)  perceived  as  contrary  to  the  public  or 
private  interest.  It  often  takes  a  cognitive  act  of  abstract 
construal  to  see  and  to  appreciate  the  value  of  justice. 
Beneficence, on the other hand, is a concrete virtue. It has a 
psychological core, which is the sympathy generated in the 
agent  by  the  pleasure  or  relief  of  suffering  the  patient 
experiences  in  the  particular,  often  immediate, 
circumstances that present themselves.7 Thus we often find 
a “bias”8 in favor of approving acts of beneficence relative to 
approving  acts  of  justice.  Unfortunately,  such  a  bias  has 
social costs because less justice and more beneficence will 
tend to be produced than is socially optimal. This holds true 
at  the  level  of  inter-individual  behavior,  in  the  legislative 
process, and in the judicial process.
1. HUME’S MORAL PSYCHOLOGY
Hume primarily concerned himself with explaining why 
and how we approve or disapprove of mental dispositions or 
character traits that act as the basis of actions. We approve 
of those that are “useful or agreeable to the person himself 
or  to  others.”9 We regard  mental  dispositions  as  useful  if 
their associated actions tend to benefit the self, others, or 
society-at-large. Justice and integrity are two examples. But 
since Hume is not a Benthamite utilitarian,10 approbation is 
not reduced entirely to the utility of the act. Sometimes acts 
fail to produce benefit through no fault of the agent, even if 
they have a tendency, under normal conditions, to produce 
such a benefit.11  Nevertheless, we see such a disposition as 
7
7
. One  of  the  reasons  that  beneficence  is  greater  among  close 
relatives,  friends,  and even  strangers  in  Good  Samaritan  cases  than in 
cases of people in need in far away and unpublicized places is that the 
psychological and social distance between the agent and patient is less in 
the  former.  And thus the  positive  psychological  feedback  deriving  from 
sympathy is greater.
8
8
. The word “bias” is used in a non-normative sense. The normativity 
focuses on the consequence of the biased behavior in producing a negative 
external effect.
9
9
. DAVID HUME,  ENQUIRIES CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING AND CONCERNING THE 
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 268 (L. A. Selby-Bigge ed., Clarendon Press 1975) (1770) 
[hereinafter HUME, ENQUIRIES] (emphasis added).
10
1
. A  Benthamite  utilitarian  believes  that  we  ought  to  approve  or 
disapprove of an act solely because of its consequences for the happiness 
of human beings.  See JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 2 
(Laurence J. LaFleur ed. Hafner Publ’g Co. 1948) (1789).
11 . As Hume explains,
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a virtue. Other dispositions may seem intrinsically pleasing 
or  agreeable  to  the  self  or  to  others  (e.g.,  decency  and 
cheerfulness).
As  we  can  see  from  the  examples  above,  in  Hume’s 
moral psychology, the root of our approval or disapproval of 
mental  states  or  dispositions  lies  in  their  tendency  to 
produce pre- or non-moral good. “No action can be virtuous, 
or  morally  good,  unless  there  be  in  human  nature  some 
motive to produce it, distinct from a sense of morality.”12
Thus,  the tendency of  mental  dispositions to generate 
actions that produce a pre-moral benefit, whether a means 
or  an  intrinsically  or  immediately  agreeable  state,  for 
oneself, others or society-at-large, is the rationale for moral 
approbation.   This  does  not  tell  us  how  the  tendency  to 
produce pre-moral good causes us to approve certain mental 
states. This is a complex story but, for our purposes here we 
can be brief. Stephen Darwall gives us the basic structure of 
Hume’s argument:
When  we  contemplate  a  (virtuous)  trait,  we  are  led  by  an 
association of ideas to consider the pleasurable states produced or 
realized by that trait, either in the agent himself on in other “with 
whom  he  has  any  commerce”  [Hume,  Treatise,  590].  Through 
sympathy or humanity we come either to have similar pleasurable 
feelings ourselves (Treatise),  or to be pleased at the pleasurable 
feelings of those we are drawn to consider (Enquiry). This pleasure 
is  disinterested.  Therefore,  we  feel  disinterested  pleasure  in 
contemplating the trait. Therefore, we feel the moral sentiment in 
contemplating the trait. Therefore, the trait is a virtue.13
We approve of  actions to the extent that they originate 
from  virtuous  motives.  Benevolence,  for  example,  is  the 
mental  disposition  that  causes  beneficent  actions.14 The 
actions  produce,  under  normal  conditions,  happiness, 
‘Tis evident, that when we praise any actions, we regard only the 
motives that produced them, and consider the actions as signs or 
indications  of  certain  principles  in  the  mind  and  temper.  The 
external performance has no merit. We must look within to find the 
moral  quality.  This  we cannot  do directly;  and therefore  fix  our 
attention on actions, as on external  signs. But these actions are 
still considered as signs; and the ultimate object of our praise and 
approbation is in the motive, that produc’d them.
HUME, HUMAN NATURE, supra note 1, at 477.
12
1
. Id. at 479 (italics in original omitted).
13 . Stephen Darwall,  Hume and the Invention of Utilitarianism,  in HUME 
AND HUME’S CONNEXIONS 58, 68 (M. A. Stewart & John P. Wright eds., 1994).
14 . In general  I  follow the convention that  benevolence refers to the 
mental state and beneficence refers to the caused action.
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comfort,  relief  of  suffering  for  others.  We  sympathetically 
identify with these emotions and associate the sympathetic 
feelings with the dispositions and the actions.
The value of Hume’s approach for our purposes is that 
he  emphasizes  the  importance  of  motives  for  virtuous 
actions.  Furthermore,  these  motives  consist  of  mental 
associations we make between actions and their agreeable 
consequences. Thus the critical  question we must  face is: 
Does the human mind always make the appropriate mental 
associations?
To put the question in a more specific way: Is the human 
mind subject to certain biases of association that lead us to 
prefer  beneficence  to  justice  in  certain  predictable 
circumstances? If the answer to this question is yes, then we 
further  ask:  Does  this  biased  preference  have  socially 
harmful results?
2. NATURAL AND ARTIFICIAL VIRTUES
From the perspective of Hume’s moral psychology one of 
the  most  important  distinctions  he  makes  is  between 
“natural virtues” and “artificial virtues.”15  Benevolence is a 
natural virtue and justice is an artificial virtue. The difference 
lies  primarily  in  the  nature  of  motive  that  is  behind  our 
approval  or  disapproval  of  a  mental  disposition  and  its 
associated  actions.  Approval  of  natural  virtues  can  be 
explained  only on  the  basis  of  fundamental  human 
propensities that are unrelated to the establishment of moral 
conventions or, more generally, to the coordinated behavior 
of other people. As Hume explains:
A parent flies to the relief of his child; transported by that natural 
sympathy  which  actuates  him,  and  which  afford  no  leisure  to 
reflect on the sentiments or conduct of the rest of mankind in like 
circumstances.  A  generous  man  cheerfully  embraces  the 
opportunity  of  saving  his  friend;  because  he  then  feels  himself 
under the dominion of beneficent affections, nor is he concerned 
whether  any  other  person  in  the  universe  were  ever  before 
actuated by such noble motives, or will ever afterwards prove their 
influence.16
Furthermore, the rationale of  the beneficent actions in 
these  cases  will  depend  on  specific  circumstances  of  the 
15
1
. For an extremely useful discussion of Hume’s view of virtues, see 
JAMES BAILLE, HUME: ON MORALITY 143–88 (2000).
16 . HUME, ENQUIRIES, supra note 9, at 303.
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individual  cases “without any more enlarged views . . . .”17 
This  particular  person  in  this  particular  situation  has  this 
particular problem to be ameliorated in this particular way. 
Because  of  the  self-contained  or  discrete  nature  of 
beneficent actions the agent always approves of them, that 
is, he approves of each instance of its manifestation. Thus, 
there  is  positive  feedback  in  the  form  of  a  positive 
sympathetic  feeling  attendant  upon  our  mental  image  of 
each case of beneficence.
The artificial virtue of justice, on the other hand, is based 
on  a  convention  or  social  artifice.  The  convention  is  this: 
Each of us agrees to respect property rights, contract, etc., 
on the condition that each other person will do so as well. 
We each find it in our self-interest to constrain our narrower 
self-interest in violating the laws of justice, but only if others 
also so constrain themselves. So the social benefit of justice 
is  derived  from  the  particular  form  of  coordination of 
individual  behavior  that  it  engenders.  The “more enlarged 
view” is of the essence here. Justice thus has an important 
abstract component. The abstraction consists of its impact 
on the pattern of social behavior.
From the point of view of society, the benefit resulting 
from  justice  “is  not  the  consequence  of  every  individual 
single  act;  but  arises  from  the  whole  scheme  or  system 
concurred  in  by  the  whole,  or  the  greater  part  of  the 
society.”18  In  their  individual  or particular application,  the 
laws of justice may “deprive, without scruple, a beneficent 
man of all his possessions, if acquired by mistake, without a 
good title; in order to bestow them on a selfish miser, who 
has  already  heaped  up  immense  stores  of  superfluous 
riches.”19 Our  benevolent  sentiments  rebel  against  this 
because  of  the  terrible  mental  image  suggested  by  this 
application.
The application of justice suppresses the importance of 
many concrete individual circumstances that appeal to the 
benevolent sentiments of human beings. Compare:
All of the laws of nature, which regulate property [justice] . . . are 
general,  and  regard  alone  some essential  circumstances  of  the 
case,  without taking into consideration the characters, situations, 
and  connexions  of  the  person  concerned,  or  any  particular 
17
1
. Id. at 304.
18 . Id.
19 . Id. at 305.
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consequences which may result  from the determination of these 
laws in any particular case which offers. 20
However, sympathetic particulars exert a powerful pull 
on our sense of benevolence:
Now as everything, that is contiguous to us, either in space or time, 
strikes upon us with such an idea, it has a proportional effect on 
the will and passions, and commonly operates with more force than 
any object, that lies in a more distant and obscure light. Tho’ we 
may be fully convinc’d, that the latter object excels the former, we 
are not able to regulate our actions by this judgment, but yield to 
the solicitations of  our passions,  which always  plead in  favor  of 
what is near and contiguous. 21
In  Hume’s  moral  psychology,  then,  there  is  a  conflict 
between  benevolence  and  justice  arising  from  the  often 
stronger pull of sympathetic concrete particulars compared 
to the more rational or abstract appreciation of the value of 
suppressing consideration of these particulars in the service 
of justice.
3. CONSTRUAL LEVELS: AN INTRODUCTION
The  law  finds  a  poor,  elderly,  and  ill  person  to  have 
inadequate title to the land upon which her home is built. 
The law returns the property to a rich miser who will have 
the house demolished and simply hold the vacant land for 
possible future use.
How will such an event be characterized? Is it a failure of 
benevolence?  If  so,  the  observer  will  experience  moral 
disapproval. Is it the return of property to its rightful owner? 
If  so,  the  observer  will  view  it  as  an  unfortunate,  but 
necessary, application of the rules of justice. He will, on the 
whole, experience moral approval.
We can characterize any event in more than one way. 
How we characterize it is significant for both evaluation and 
for behavior. We can shed some light on the evaluative and 
behavioral implications of the above event by applying the 
findings of modern Construal Level Theory (CLT).22
Events, objects and actions can be construed at either a 
low  or  high  level.  “Low-level  construals  are  relatively 
unstructured,  contextualized  representations  that  include 
20 . Id. (emphasis added).
21 . HUME, HUMAN NATURE, supra note 1, at 535.
22 . Yaacov Trope et al.,  Construal Effects and Psychological Distance:  
Effects  on  Representation,  Prediction,  Evaluation,  and  Behavior,  17  J. 
CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 83, 83 (2007).
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subordinate  and  incidental  features  of  events.  High-level 
construals,  in  contrast,  are  schematic,  decontextualized 
representations  that  extract  the  gist  from  the  available 
information.”23 Acts of beneficence have the hallmarks of the 
relatively concrete. They are discrete or self-contained acts. 
Many particulars are relevant to their moral worth. Whether 
the potential beneficiary is rich or poor, happy or sad, world-
wise or  somewhat  incompetent,  ill  or  healthy,  etc.  are  all 
important.  We  consider  similar  factors  as  relevant  in  the 
condition of  the potential  benefactor.  Thus, the immediate 
context is essential. Acts of justice, on the other hand, have 
the characteristics of a high-level construal. In the first place, 
we  suppress  many  particular  circumstances,  relevant  to 
beneficence,  in  the characterization  of  situations to which 
the  rules  of  justice  are  applied.  For  example,  the  above 
litany of sympathetic characteristics is at least prima facie 
irrelevant in cases of justice. Furthermore, we see that acts 
of justice are not discrete or self-contained in terms of their 
moral rationale. Their relatively abstract or decontextualized 
conceptualization  makes  it  easier  to  see  the  connection 
among single acts of justice. It is an abstract understanding 
that holds, “the whole plan or scheme is highly conducive, or 
indeed absolutely requisite, both to the support of society, 
and the well-being of every individual.”24
The findings of CLT support the general conclusion that, 
the smaller  the  psychological  distance  between the event 
and the evaluator-agent, the more likely it will be construed 
at  a  low  level.  Psychological  distance  can  be  measured 
across several  dimensions,  including the temporal,  spatial, 
social and hypothetical. Thus when individuals are asked to 
characterize an event in the present or near future, in close 
spatial  proximity,  involving  people  they  care  about,  in  a 
realistic  or  probable  scenario,  they  are  more  likely  to 
characterize it concretely. When the psychological distance 
along any of  these dimensions becomes greater,  they are 
more likely to characterize the event at an abstract level.
Consider now an individual who faces a real situation like 
the one with which we started this section. He sees or hears 
of an old, poor, ill person being displaced right now by a rich, 
miserly land owner. It is occurring in a town very near to the 
23
2
. Id.
24 . HUME, HUMAN NATURE, supra note 1, at 497.
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observer.  The  observer  has  a  mother  similar  in  age  and 
condition  to  the  displaced  old  person.  And  since  it  is 
happening,  it  is  not  a  hypothetical  scenario.  In  these 
circumstances,  CLT  predicts  a  low-level  construal  of  the 
event. In our terms, this means it will be more likely to be 
viewed as a failure of beneficence than as an application of 
justice.
The predictions of CLT are also supported by the kind of 
psychological feedback associated with seeing or performing 
acts of beneficence compared to that associated with acts of 
justice. The positive feedback from an act of justice requires 
an abstract mental “image” or conception of the value of the 
institution of property. This is less likely to be experienced 
when psychological distance is small. On the other hand, the 
feedback from an act of beneficence seems more concrete 
and direct. It is more likely to be perceived under conditions 
of less psychological distance.
4. EVALUATIVE AND BEHAVIORAL IMPLICATIONS OF 
CONSTRUAL LEVELS
CLT has implications for evaluation of options at different 
levels  of  construal  and  for  the  behavior  of  agents  with 
respect to those options.
The case of returning land to the person with the better 
property title discussed above can provide a good example 
of  the impact  of  construal  on valuation.  This  event has a 
more favorable  affective value at  a high-level  than a low-
level of construal.25 At the high level the observer sees the 
strengthening of the institution of justice. At the low level he 
sees a poor person deprived of something she needs. This 
event  will  seem more  and more  positive  as  psychological 
distance  increases.  This  occurs  because,  as  distance 
increases,  there  will  be  a  greater  weighting  of  high-level 
values than low-level values. 26
On the other hand, imagine that a very benevolent judge 
decides  that  the  land  should  remain  with  the  current 
occupier due to her need. This event appears more positive 
at a low level of construal than at a high-level. At the low 
25
2
. This  is  a  contingent  value,  that  is,  contingent  on  the  level  of 
construal  being  determined.  Construal  is  in  turn  determined  by  the 
psychological distance between observer and event.
26 . It  will  also  appear  more  negative  as  psychological  distance 
decreases because there will be greater weighting of low-level values.
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level  the  particular  circumstances  stand  out  and  the 
observer sees the comfort provided to the elderly woman. At 
the  high  level  the  observer  sees  the  weakening  of  the 
institution  of  justice.  Greater  psychological  distance  will 
reduce the evaluation of this event as the lower-level values 
are weighted less.  When psychological  distance decreases 
this  act  of  leaving the land in  the possession of  the poor 
woman will be construed at a low level and as an instance of 
beneficence. The positive evaluation will be weighted more 
than the negative high-level construal of a failure of justice.
Therefore,  at  the  moment  when  the  judicial  or  moral 
decision is made, when psychological distance is small, there 
will be a tendency for the decision-maker to approve acts of 
beneficence rather than single acts of justice. This does not 
mean that all  spectators will  prefer beneficence to justice. 
Some  decision-makers  may  place  a  very  small  low-level 
construal value on beneficence and a very great high-level 
construal  value  on  justice.  Thus,  even when the  low-level 
value  carries  more  weight,  they  may  prefer  justice. 
Nevertheless,  for  any  given  distribution  of  low-level 
valuations  of  justice  (or  beneficence),  as  psychological 
distance falls there will be movement of the population of  
decision-makers in the direction of valuing beneficence more 
and justice less.
There  are  important  implications  for  behavior.  The 
decision-maker is in a position to implement either an act of 
justice or beneficence. Should “a man . . . of a beneficent 
disposition [restore] a great fortune to a miser, or seditious 
bigot”?27 If he possesses a beneficent disposition then he will 
experience some cost or pain in returning the fortune to a 
great miser at the expense of someone who is needy. This 
cost, however, will not  in itself be sufficient to prevent him 
from doing so. CLT predicts that his behavior will depend on 
whether he thinks of this cost as relating to only “secondary” 
features of the situation. If he construes the situation at a 
low level he will  not.  Furthermore, CLT predicts he will,  in 
fact,  construe  matters  at  a  low  level  when  psychological 
distance is small. I have argued that psychological distance 
will  be small  when the situation is immediately before the 
decision-maker or observer either in person or in his mind. In 
this case, he will focus on the unique, specific, and concrete. 
27
2
. HUME, HUMAN NATURE, supra note 1, at 497.
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The  beneficent  disposition  will  dominate  and  he  will  not 
return the property.
On the other hand, if he construes the situation at a high 
level, he will divide it into “primary” or general features and 
“secondary”  or  incidental  features.  The  primary  features 
relate the return of property to the miser to the institution of 
justice as well  as its vital  role in ensuring property rights. 
High-level  construal  downplays  the  unique,  concrete 
considerations of the poor, elderly woman and her troubles. 
As  we  have  seen,  this  construal  will  be  more  likely  the 
greater the psychological distance. In these circumstances, 
the  man  of  beneficent  disposition  will  still  experience 
displeasure  at  the  thought  of  returning  property  to  the 
miser.28 Nevertheless,  CLT research has found support  for 
the hypothesis that construal at a high level enhances “self-
control.” In other words, it increases the likelihood that the 
individual will act in accordance with the primary or global 
features of the situation and sacrifice the secondary when 
that  is  required.  Thus,  high-level  construal  will  encourage 
deciding  consistently  with  justice  or  approving  such 
decisions of others in like cases.
The self-control exhibited in this case is not primarily a 
matter of preferring future benefits over immediate benefits. 
The act of beneficence that is juxtaposed to the act of justice 
in our example need not be construed in this way. One might 
think  of  the  single  act  of  beneficence  as  one  of  many 
instances  of  helping  the  unfortunate  and,  as  such,  an 
application  of  a  principle of  beneficence.29 Under  this 
characterization the high-construal agent does not so much 
sacrifice  immediate  for  long-term  benefits  but,  rather, 
secondary for primary values.
5. THE “BIAS” AND ITS SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES
From  the  point  of  view  of  greater  temporal  distance, 
these  preferences  will  seem “biased” toward  beneficence. 
Thus,  looking  at  such  events  either  retrospectively  or 
prospectively, justice will  seem to be inadequately served. 
28 . He might “have reason to wish, that with regard to that single act, 
the laws of justice were for a moment suspended in the universe.” Id.
29 . Even  as  a  principle,  however,  beneficence  still  requires  in  its 
application attention to many more concrete details than an application of 
a principle of justice. The latter, as we have seen above, suppresses many 
facts of time and place both with respect to persons and their situations.
MARIO J. RIZZO, "JUSTICE VERSUS BENEVOLENCE: A MODERN HUMEAN VIEW," 9(2) MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 
883-898 (2008).
894 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 9:2
Economic  theory  contains  no  tool  or  idea,  however,  that 
enables us to say that the valuations and behavior relative 
to high-level construal are correct and those relative to low-
level construal are incorrect. All we can say as economists 
or, more generally, as value-free social scientists is that the 
perspectives  are  different.  They  are  certainly  inconsistent 
with each other; but rendering them consistent can be done 
by privileging either the low-level construal or the high.
The high-level  construal  is  important,  however,  insofar 
as it explains why individuals might seek to constrain their 
beneficent  behavior.  Those  in  authoritative  positions  in 
academia may strive not to get too deeply involved with a 
particular  student  so  as  to  be  just  in  grading,  granting 
extensions,  recommendation  letters,  etc.  They  may  also 
seek  to  impose  rules  on  themselves  such  as  grading 
according to certain objective indicia instead of by general 
impression or asking the students to put their ID number and 
not their name on the exam paper.
It  may  also  explain  why  individuals  in  their  private 
capacity  approve of  social  and political  rules  that  restrain 
impulsive  beneficent  behavior  or  why,  in  their  public 
capacity, they write constitutions and laws that strictly apply 
the rules of justice.
In addition to these purely positive explanations there is 
some  normative  component.  Each  act  that  is  contrary  to 
justice  imposes  a  negative  externality  on  the  rest  of 
society.30 This  occurs  because  it  weakens  the  general 
institutions  that  protect  property,  contract  or  personal 
integrity.  To  the  extent  that  the  individual  bias  toward 
30
3
. This  raises  the  thorny  problem  of  whether  every beneficent 
exception to justice imposes a negative externality. There are, of course, 
well-known arguments that sometimes the rules of justice can be too strict 
and  that  “equity”  demands  exceptions  in  accordance  with  beneficence. 
This  is  a  complex  issue.  In  the  first  place,  if  we  are  talking  about 
incorporating rule-like exceptions to, say, the return of property to rightful 
title  holders,  we  are  not  talking  about  beneficence  in  its  particularistic 
sense at all. We may be talking about some welfare-enhancing tweaking 
that itself requires a fairly abstract construal. For example, in certain class 
of situations defined in fairly precise and objective terms, the optimal rule 
may require some other decision. Low-level construals are not adequate to 
this task. Secondly, if we are talking about a one-off exception based on 
very high concrete costs in a particularly harsh case of the application of 
justice, then it is hard to say anything systematic about that. The point of 
the analysis above is that the bias toward beneficence is not confined to 
these extreme cases.
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beneficence  is  not  entirely  offset  by  long-run  self-  or 
institutional-constraints,  the  bias  will  reflect  a  negative 
externality.  In this  sense only,  can we label  the “bias” as 
undesirable.
6. POSSIBLE APPLICATIONS OF THE THEORY
In this section I address two possible applications of the 
theoretical considerations outlined above. The first is rent-
seeking  through  the  legislative  process.  The  second  is  a 
mechanism  of  possible  decay  in  judicial  decision-making 
consistent with the rules of justice.  These applications are 
highly speculative and tentative.
A. RENT-SEEKING
Most  individuals  understand  that  special  interests  will 
seek rents  through any political  process  in  which there is 
possible entry. In the case of the application of the rules of 
justice, we have seen that there exists a negative externality 
attendant on deviations from those rules in the direction of 
beneficence. In some cases we will find large concentrated 
benefits  to  particular  groups  that  make  it  worthwhile  for 
them to push for a specific weakening of the rules of justice. 
Imposition of tariffs, for example, violates justice in the form 
of freedom of contract.31
Suppose that the domestic steel producers and workers’ 
union support a rise in the protective tariff on imported steel 
to assist workers who would otherwise lose their jobs and 
localities  which would be devastated by further closure of 
steel  plants.  Some who are favorably  inclined  toward  this 
measure might call it “beneficence.”32
Our concern here is not the political  economy of rent-
seeking but the effect of rent-seeking on the ways in which 
ordinary citizens perceive the activities of the rent-seekers. 
31
3
. A tariff on imported products is not only an economic issue but it is 
an issue of justice as well.  There is certainly a strong presumption that 
people  ought  to  be  able  to  trade  on  whatever  terms  at  which  they 
voluntarily  arrive  without  the  intervention  of  third  parties.  This  is  an 
example of freedom of contract—part of Humean justice.
32 . In  the  political  process  it  seems  appropriate  to  put  the  word 
beneficence  in  quotation  marks  because  it  is  difficult  to  see  true 
beneficence  when  the  support  for  deviations  from  justice  comes  from 
groups which have a financial interest in them. Others might refer to the 
measure as an instance of distributive “justice.” Following Hume, I do not 
use the term justice in this way.
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To the extent that they construe these actions at a high level 
they will find that issues of justice arise in their minds. Why 
should people be forced to buy higher priced steel when, in 
general, we allow people to buy and sell at whatever prices 
the  market  will  sustain?  Other  individuals,  besides  steel 
workers, suffer from the effects of more able competitors—
why are they not protected? Would it  be a good thing to 
protect the prices of all buyers or sellers who are in “need?” 
As one generalizes this issue the more unappealing this type 
of intervention becomes. Public opposition will be easier to 
generate. On the other hand, if the case is construed in low-
level  terms,  the  minds  of  citizens  will  be  focused  on  the 
particular sorrows and difficulties of the steel workers. In this 
situation,  gathering  public  support  or,  at  least  forestalling 
public opposition, will be easier.
It is certainly possible that psychologically-sophisticated 
rent-seekers might deliberately seek to have the public issue 
construed in concrete terms. Suppose, however, they are not 
so sophisticated.  It  is  likely  anyway that  the issue will  be 
posed in  low-level  terms.  This  is  because  the  specifics  of 
their  situation  are  what  the  special  interests  know.  In 
addition,  they are interested in the prevention or relief  of 
economic distress concentrated among their members and 
not  more  abstract  issues.  They  will  make  their  case  in 
concrete and particular terms.
Research conducted by those working in the area of CLT 
has  shown,  at  least  in  a  preliminary  way,  that  when 
experimental participants are primed with abstract thinking, 
specifically,  abstract  words  in  a  preliminary  word-search 
task, they become more oriented toward future benefits and 
their level of impatience decreases. Those who were primed 
with concrete words tended to be more present-oriented.33 If 
these effects generalize,  it  would not be surprising to find 
that the low-level construals of their problems advanced by 
rent-seekers would tend to make citizens focus on the here-
and-now beneficence aspects and not on the more abstract 
or longer-term justice issues.
33
3
. See Trope et al., supra note 22, at 93; S.A. Malkoc et al., Impatience 
is  in  the  Mindset:  Carryover  Effects  of  Processing  Abstractness  in 
Sequential  Tasks  (2006)  (unpublished  manuscript,  on  file  with  the 
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill).
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B. JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING34
We suppose that judges make their reputation, by and 
large,  by adhering to the precedents set by other judges. 
Nevertheless, it may well be the case that judges differ in 
their  beneficence  propensities.  Some  judges  may  be 
tempted more than others to depart from justice in deciding 
a particular case. These judges perhaps construe the issues 
more  concretely;  that  is,  more  in  terms  of  the  particular 
circumstances in a discrete case. Low-level construal is their 
personal predilection. For example, such a judge may feel 
greater  temptation  to  depart  from  the  general  rules  that 
enforce  contracts  against  individuals  in  breach  or  impose 
liability  on  negligent  parties  because  the  particularly 
sympathetic circumstances of the party who is responsible in 
each case. The judge will pay a certain price in terms of loss 
of  reputation  but  he  feels  it  is  worth  it.  If  he  decides 
according  to  his  beneficence  preference,  he  will  create  a 
precedent  that  moves  the  line  of  acceptable  excuses 
slightly. This will make it more likely that another judge with 
a  marginally  lesser  propensity  to  beneficence  will  find  a 
basis (in that first decision) for moving the line still farther. 
While  each  judge  imposes  a  negative  externality  on  the 
system,  he  is  partially  protected  in  reputation  by  the 
previous  decision  and  so  the  system  moves  toward  a 
weakening  of  the  rules  of  justice.  In  rationalizing  such 
decisions the relatively-beneficent judge lowers the level of 
problem-construal  reflecting  at  least  in  a  rough  way  his 
personal predilection. In the circumstances outlined above, 
the system of precedent can lower the level of construal in 
the law.35
CONCLUSIONS
All actions can be characterized in more than one way. 
This is especially important in those cases where motivations 
and  consequences  are  multifaceted.   David  Hume 
34
3
. This is a summary of the analysis in Mario J. Rizzo & Douglas Glen 
Whitman,  The Camel’s Nose is in the Tent: Rules, Theories, and Slippery 
Slopes, 51 UCLA L. REV. 539, 568–70 (2003).
35 . On  the  other  hand,  levels  of  construal  might  rise  through  the 
mechanism of  precedent  as  they have in  First  Amendment  free-speech 
cases. See Frederick Schauer, Harry Kalven and the Perils of Particularism, 
56  U.  CHI.  L.  REV. 397,  403–04  (1989)  (reviewing  HARRY KALVEN,  A  WORTHY 
TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA (1988)).
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understood that the psychology of moral action is a critical 
aspect of individual and social behavior.
In  this  Article  I  have  shown  that  individuals  may 
characterize the same action as a lack of beneficence or as 
the application of justice depending on how it is construed. A 
single act of beneficence is a concrete virtue with immediate 
positive affect or positive psychological feedback. Justice is 
more abstract. Individuals may view a single act of justice 
disapprovingly,  even  though  the  institution  of  justice  is 
necessary  for  the  maintenance  of  society  and  social 
cooperation.  For  my purposes,  the contribution of  modern 
Construal Level Theory shows that there is predictability in 
the way actions or  events are construed.  The smaller  the 
psychological distance between an action or event and the 
decision-maker  or  observer  the  more  likely  the  decision-
maker will construe it at a lower level of abstraction. Lower-
level  construal,  I  conjecture,  is  more  likely  to  lead to  the 
approval  of  acts of  beneficence relative to acts of  justice. 
This  introduces  a  negative  externality  into  the  system of 
moral,  legal  and even political  decision-making. Too much 
beneficence relative to justice, from the point of view of the 
social optimum, will  be produced. This need not be where 
the process stops, however, if individuals in the private or 
public capacity adopt rules and procedures to make higher 
level  construals  of  moral,  legal,  or  political  actions  more 
likely, thus rebalancing the system in favor of acts of justice.
